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META-EVIDENCE: DO WE NEED IT?
Christopher B. Mueller *
This Essay applies the prefix "meta" to evidence law to help deter-
mine whether existing evidence doctrine and its underlying values serve
us well in the settings of toxic tort suits and child abuse prosecutions.
There are other indications in this closing decade of the twentieth cen-
tury that evidence doctrine is inadequate on matters of specific detail1
and in more sweeping ways.2 But something can be learned from the two
controversial areas considered here.
* Henry S. Lindsley Professor of Law, University of Colorado; A.B., 1966, Haverford
College; J.D., 1969, Boalt Hall.
1. Omitted is a discussion of Federal Rules of Evidence that are spectacular in their fail-
ure, like FED. R. EVID. 201 on judicial notice (seldom cited; more complicated than it is
worth); and FED. R. EVID. 301 on presumptions in civil cases (incoherent because it seems to
adopt the Thayer "bursting bubble" philosophy, but legislative comments imply that presump-
tions are more durable and unacceptable because courts think many presumptions simply
should not disappear when counterproof is offered). Other problematic provisions include
FED. R. EviD. 608 (confusing because it bars extrinsic proof of acts by witness, but not when
such proof contradicts his or her direct testimony); FED. R. EVID. 407 (which does or does not
apply in strict liability suits and is or is not substantive under Erie doctrine); and numerous
hearsay exceptions, including FED. R. EvID. 803(3) (state-of-mind statements); FED. R. EViD.
804(b)(1) (former testimony); and FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (statements against penal interest).
2. Empirical experiments suggest that laypeople are not good at detecting deliberate
falsehood, and there is some indication that observers are worse at it when they watch facial
expressions (they do better to listen to voice and focus on posture and physical cues other than
expression). See Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1988, at 262-64; Olin G. Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 1075, 1078-91 (1991). In addition, several academic psychologists have made strong
arguments that eyewitness identification testimony, which is particularly important in criminal
prosecutions, is unreliable. See, e.g., EYEWrrNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPEC-
TiVES (Gary Wells & Elizabeth Loftus eds., 1984). Critics suggest that our approach to expert
testimony has also failed in different ways-we invite too much of it because applicable legal
standards are vague and uncertain (even irrelevant), and expert testimony sometimes violates
important process values underlying the hearsay doctrine and the Confrontation Clause. See,
e.g., Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REv.
577, 584-86 (1986); Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on
Affirmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 234, 242-51 (1984). Further,
doctrinal scholars continue to attack the hearsay doctrine head on, usually arguing that it is
dysfunctional and excludes too much. See generally Roger C. Park, A Subject Matter Ap-
proach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REv. 51 (1987) (summarizing and replying to stan-
dard attacks and proposing limited reform); Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to
Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1339 (1987) (proposing alternative to hearsay doctrine).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Among branches of adjective law, evidence is not alone in facing
evolutionary challenge.3 In civil procedure, the Federal Rules (now
more than fifty years old) sought to reduce formalism, introduce flexibil-
ity, expand the concerns that count in litigation and propel cases toward
trial on the merits. But now the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
expected to provide guidance on questions far beyond the vision of their
framers, and their meaning and utility are in question in the setting of
complex litigation, especially consolidated suits and class actions.4  In
criminal procedure, serious challenges have arisen in sentencing, where
the modern effort to achieve fairness by flexibility was overwhelmed by
complaints that instead the result was uneven application. The new ap-
proach involves specific guidelines, which have been met in turn with a
barrage of criticism.5 In choice of law and jurisdiction, conventional
doctrine is on the verge of incoherence or irrelevance in some settings.
The promising analytical tool known as interest analysis and the uneasy
marriage of jurisdiction-selecting rules and general principles set out in
the Second Restatement seem almost meaningless in mass toxic exposure
cases, where traditional barriers to jurisdiction in any single federal court
have come to be seen as quaint. Reformers hope to ameliorate these
problems by federalizing choice of law rules and expanding personal and
subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts, but these attempts are mired
down and enormously problematic.'
3. For evidence scholars, the enthusiasm that greeted the coming of the Federal Rules
has passed and experience in applying the Rules has brought imperfections to light. Also,
questions of legitimacy similar to those confronting constitutional theorists are beginning to
affect evidence law. Modem challenges to common values and assumptions have taken on a
stridency not always seen in academic or political discourse, and are beginning to reach evi-
dence law.
4. See, e.g., Steven N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 992 (1987) (principal
architect of Civil Procedure Rules "made an art form out of procedural formlessness," re-
jecting arguments that "form is the essence of procedure" and that "oversimplified practice in
a merged system would ultimately lead to chaos."). See generally A.L.I. COMPLEX LITIGA-
TION PROJECT, chs. 1-3 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1989), chs. 3, 5 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989) (recom-
mending, inter alia, sweeping intersystem consolidation system and expanded federal
jurisdiction).
5. For a discussion of the problem, see generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988)
(analyzing competing goals and practical needs that led to compromises in guidelines).
6. Governmental interest analysis as a method of choice of law was developed by the late
Professor Currie and championed in recent years by Professor Kay. See, e.g., BRAINERD CUR-
RIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188-282 (1963); Herma Hill Kay, A
Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 R.C.A.D.I. 22 (1989). The American
Law Institute endorsed elements of this approach, combined with lists of factors and contacts
pointing to the state of "most significant relationship," all supplemented by narrow default
rules addressing particular problems. See factors set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
[Vol. 25:819
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I hope "meta-evidence" calls to mind an approach to issues of proof
combining standard doctrine and its underlying values with insights from
the sciences and with at least renewed awareness that structural
problems and occasionally substantive issues affect evidentiary dilem-
mas.7 My own answer to the question in the title is neither certain nor
sanguine, but qualified and conflicted. In the areas considered here, I
think the answer is yes and no. In toxic tort cases, the yes pait is that
evidence law needs help, that existing doctrine is inadequate and under-
lying values do not take us very far, that we need both evidence reform
and help from science. The no part is that science can only help a little,
that unaddressed structural problems and difficult issues of procedure
and substance have strained evidence law and the factfinding function of
courts, and that easy expedients like lowering the barriers that keep cases
from going to juries are not promising. In child abuse prosecutions the
yes part is that science can help a little, but the no part is that science
cannot do much to help determine particular issues of historical fact or
resolve difficult hearsay problems.
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). In the setting of consolidated complex litigation, including
mass tort litigation, many hope for salvation in federalized choice of law rules. See, e.g., A.L.I.
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, ch. 6 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1990).
Apart from the problem of finding consensus, the difficulty with this step is that federaliz-
ing choice of law rules is likely to result either in applying the laws of many states to various
aspects of litigation with multistate elements (simplifying the selection process but leaving
great complexities), or selecting the laws of only a few interested states on the basis of substan-
tive preferences (which would make federalized choice of law clumsy and awkward, and would
effectively adopt federal substantive standards). On the problems of federalized choice of law
rules, see generally Mary K. Kane, Drafting Choice of Law Rules for Complex Litigation:
Some Preliminary Thoughts, 10 REv. Lrri. 309 (1991) (discussing problems arising in com-
plex litigation context relating to choice of law rules). On the problem of expanded federal
jurisdiction, see generally Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Juris-
diction, 59 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 169 (1990) (addressing substantive and procedural problems
surrounding complex dispute resolution).
7. I am not the first in the legal academy to borrow the prefix. See William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945 (1989) (reviewing ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCE-
DURE (1988)). This review, using rhetoric attempting to nudge readers toward an academic
vision of political correctness, contrasts the "Hobbesian Paradigm" of private-rights litigation
with the "Brown Paradigm" that adjudication is a process for developing and articulating
"public values," and assumes we know just outcomes and a just society when we see them. I
am unpersuaded by this attempted "paradigm shift" (I think that is a word visionaries might
use) and less confident about what makes just outcomes and just societies. In the areas ad-
dressed in this Essay, nobody can be sure what the right vision is because the social and eco-
nomic background is complex and contested and seldom grasped in a comprehensive way, and
lofty visions do not produce the arguments that count.
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I. UNDERLYING VALUES: A BRIEF APPRAISAL
A. What Do We Have Here?
Underlying American evidence law are a handful of well-known
concerns, usually described in general terms. High on the list are mis-
trust of juries, insuring care in factfinding and controlling the manner
and scope of trials.8 Stated more softly are policies relating to particular
suits (intrinsic policies) and broader (extrinsic) policies. In addition to
being general (perhaps for that reason) these concerns overlap and some-
times conflict, are complicated and many sided and find expression in
different ways in different doctrines.
Also underlying American evidence law are two cultures that gener-
ate competing and sometimes conflicting views of the nature of trials.
One may be called the truth-seeking vision, holding that an important
social purpose of trials is to reach sound results and that accurate
factfinding is essential to this end.9 The other may be called the rhetori-
cal vision, holding that parties are responsible for trying suits and must
have not only the means to develop and uncover truth in any particular
case, but also the means to persuade fact finders as to what is true. Not
surprisingly, academic scholars emphasize the former, while practicing
lawyers emphasize the latter, and judges are harder to characterize.
Hearsay, to pick the central doctrine of American evidence law, im-
plicates most of these concerns. The conventional reason for excluding
hearsay is mistrust of juries-a fear that lay fact finders cannot properly
appraise remote statements and are too unsuspecting. However, the con-
cerns underlying hearsay are somewhat broader. Care in factfinding is
implicated because remote statements bypass the safeguards of the trial
process (oath, demeanor, cross-examination), and it seems to be univer-
sally agreed that any fact finder (not just lay juries) can better appraise a
8. Without being exhaustive, it is easy to see that evidence doctrines reflect these con-
cerns. Evidence of prior crimes is carefully regulated, in efforts to accommodate competing
interests in admitting relevant evidence against concerns that fact finders may react in anger
and defendants may be tried for what they are rather than what they did or did not do. See
FED. R. EVID. 609. Further, documentary evidence is expected to be proved by use of docu-
ments rather than less reliable accounts from human memory, unless special reasons appear to
justify doing otherwise. See FED. R. EvID. 1002. Virtually all evidence must be shown by
knowledgeable witnesses to be what the proponent claims, lest fact finders make easily avoid-
able mistakes. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
9. There is also a grand vision holding that the main purpose of courts is to articulate
"public values," but few people in the profession or the academy subscribe wholeheartedly to
that view, and it is far more common to suppose that court judgments play slow and incremen-
-tal roles in reflecting and building cultural values, as a necessary and good by-product of
resolving particular disputes, and that only in rare instances do individual judgments have
dramatic impact on public values. See supra note 7.
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human account by a live witness than one by a remote witness.1" And in
criminal cases especially, the serious limitations that hearsay doctrine
puts on use of statements produced or gathered by government agents
reflects multiple concerns: jury credulity and care in factfinding are im-
plicated. So are intrinsic policy concerns, because juries are unlikely to
appreciate the pressures faced by prosecution witnesses and law enforce-
ment agents, and probably no fact finder can reliably appraise statements
by such people. Further, as a matter of intrinsic policy we discourage
both police and prosecutors from generating the out-of-court statements
to be used against people charged with crime.
Hearsay doctrine is also a focal point of conflict between the truth-
seeking and rhetorical visions of trials. Emphasizing the former, reform-
ers have long thought all prior statements by testifying witnesses should
be admissible. Emphasizing the latter, practitioners insist on live testi-
mony by live witnesses, and believe juries remember the messenger who
recites remote statements and overlook the strengths or frailties of the
remote speaker. Practitioners, as anyone can see by reading Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1), largely won this battle."
The rules governing burdens of persuasion and presumptions illus-
trate other intrinsic policy concerns-"intrinsic" because they are linked
to applicable substantive principles. Burdens of persuasion make it easier
or harder to prevail on various kinds of claims or defenses, and a major
reason for civil presumptions is quite similar, relieving certain litigants
from having to prove important points. 2 Privilege rules rest on extrinsic
policies-"extrinsic" because the focus is to protect and encourage cer-
tain relationships independently of substantive issues in suit, perhaps
most importantly the spousal and attorney-client relationships.
B. What's Missing Here?
Perhaps nobody who teaches evidence feels comfortable with all evi-
dence doctrines or the ways they express and embody underlying values.
10. For penetrating appraisals of the hearsay doctrine, see Park, supra note 2; Swift, supra
note 2. See also my own appraisal of hearsay and reactions to Park and Swift in Christopher
Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REv.
(forthcoming 1992).
11. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (authorizing nonhearsay treatment for only few prior state-
ments by testifying witnesses).
12. In employment discrimination suits, for instance, claimants can prevail even if they
lack direct evidence of discrimination by taking advantage of a presumption that arises on
proof of some points that are more easily shown. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (discrimination presumed if plaintiff shows membership in
protected class, application for opening for which she was qualified, and that job went to
another).
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Perhaps, also, everyone who teaches evidence thinks doctrine is some-
times wrongheaded, sometimes manipulable, sometimes too rigid or par-
ticular or too loose or general, and that the underlying concerns are
elastic and the tradeoffs incommensurable-balancing probative worth
against such factors as prejudice or privacy or tendency to confuse. Such
doubts about doctrine and its underlying values are serious and have
surely crossed many of our minds, but equally serious are gaps in wider
knowledge and understanding.
One such gap in understanding is that we have little proof beyond
common sense that our doctrines are wise, and thus innumerable ques-
tions can be asked on this subject. 3 In toxic tort litigation and child
abuse prosecutions, for example, we have little insight on the question of
whether experts can educate juries by presenting them with insights on
matters of hard science or social science, although work in these related
areas is proceeding rapidly. 4 Perhaps our understanding will improve
through experiments in social science, but we should not expect too
much; it is hard to set up control models in which we can know what is
true or how actual juries function, and in most litigation settings the idea
of truth itself is infused with value judgments that are hard to reach and
harder yet to measure.'I We should take some solace in the fact that the
same lament applies to substantive doctrine too, and I think evidence
13. Do juries misappraise hearsay? Do prior deeds or crimes shed light on truthfulness or
lack thereof? Do our hearsay exceptions rest on factors that truly bear on reliability?
14. Based on empirical studies, some scholars argue that experts can help jurors exercise
sounder judgment in other circumstances. See Steven 0. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness
Expert Testimony and Jury Decisionmaking, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 43,
62-69 (discussing eyewitness identification); William Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Eval-
uate Statistical Evidence?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 9, 24-40 (discussing
use of statistical evidence in criminal cases); Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and
Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at
133, 149-50 (discussing Battered Woman and Rape Trauma Syndrome, eyewitness
identification).
15. The Article by Vidmar and Schuller reports studies showing that jurors in simulations
are affected by Battered Woman Syndrome testimony, concluding that such testimony had a
"salutary effect on the more prejudicial beliefs," apparently meaning that jurors develop more
sympathy for "the fear [a] woman feels in an abusive relationship" and about her "inability to
leave a setting in which abuse is threatened." See Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 14, at 154.
Perhaps the conclusion is correct, but the fact that expert testimony had persuasive effect does
not show the previous level of sympathy was wrong. Later, Vidmar and Schuller acknowledge
that simulations differ from actual trials because in simulations jurors "read a transcript, listen
to an audiotape, or view a videotape" and verdicts are "hypothetical" and have "no real conse-
quences." Id. at 175. Criticism on these grounds, they conclude, is "valid," but they defend
the research on the ground that many studies have been done, that some involved "actual
jurors" and found "consistent trends" and that findings are "consistent with more general
bodies of social psychological theory." Id.
META-EVIDENCE
people must make peace with the notion that doctrine itself reflects esti-
mation or judgment more than certainty or experimental measurement.1 6
Another gap is that we have little understanding of the impact of
bureaucratic litigation on evidence law. Standard doctrine focuses on the
two-party suit raising compact questions of guilt or innocence, negligence
or due care. The focus, is not consolidated or class claims or complex
questions like toxicity. Procedural conventions do not work the same
way in bureaucratic litigation, and evidence law cannot work the same
way either. 17
A third gap is a sense for the systemic impact of evidence doctrine.
Are we reaching satisfactory results, or not? Do plaintiffs or prosecutors
lose when they should win because our evidence rules are not working
well, or vice versa? We have little or no knowledge of the impact of
doctrines on the performance of courts.
II. Toxic TORT CASES
Issues of causation are, hard in toxic tort suits for many reasons.
From one perspective, the difficulties stem from scientific uncertainties
that are unavoidable because: (1) science does not have an answer (how
much do animal studies reveal about human reactions?); (2) statistical
evidence from epidemiological studies varies widely in strength in ways
typically described in terms of significance levels and confidence inter-
vals;18 (3) most proof of toxicity leaves questions of individual attribution
unanswered (whatever we may know about the sample, did a particular
16. Despite extended theoretical studies, we have little more than faith to sustain the belief
that products liability law produces a safer world. See generally GuIDO CALABRESI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (discussing legal and economic principles of accident law); WIL-
LIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) (ana-
lyzing common law of torts through positive economic theory); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987) (discussing accident law's effect on human behavior).
The real effects and shortcomings of legal doctrines creating racial preferences are seldom
examined or questioned by legal scholars, although critics have begun to emerge.
17. See, eg., Kenneth Abraham & Glen Robinson, Aggregative Valuation of Mass Tort
Claims, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 137, 141, 146-47 (1990) (proposing use
of statistical claims profiles as evidence in mass tort cases and suggesting use of presumptions
and rules allocating burden of proof to discourage individual claimants from claiming more
damages than profile permits).
18. Statistical significance turns on p-value, which essentially describes the frequency that
exposure would be associated with a symptom as a matter of chance (without playing a causal
role). Usually epidemiologists require a p-value of .05 or better, meaning that chance would
explain observed symptoms only 5% of the time. Confidence interval describes the range in
which the mean of a study parameter is found, and conventionally epidemiologists set a confi-
dence interval of 95% (for that or any other selected confidence interval, a large sample pro-
duces more persuasive results than a small one). See generally Troyen A. Brennan, Causal
Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Liti-
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claimant become sick from exposure?); and (4) possibilities of multiple or
synergistic causation appear (did asbestos cause lung cancer, or was
smoking the cause, or both?).19
From a related perspective, these difficulties stem from differences
between the cultures of science and law. Epidemiologists think of cause
as statistical correlation and focus on groups, with the aim of identifying
risk or developing treatment or strategies to minimize risk. Tort law
faces questions of individual causation, and lawyers and judges tend to
see causation as a chain of events, with the purpose of determining legal
responsibility and furthering the aims of compensation and deterrence.
From another perspective, the difficulties are structural. Should tort
law be the mechanism for compensating victims of toxic torts, or should
insurance programs (first-party or public coverage) perform the func-
tion? Should special agencies resolve claims, or should they be litigated
in common law courts?
From yet another perspective, the difficulties are procedural and
substantive rather than evidential. Should tort law compensate for in-
creased risk where physical injury is not yet manifest? Can tort law ap-
propriately regulate risk and deliver compensation in toxic tort cases?
Should claimants be compelled or encouraged to litigate in collective
suits, with liability determined on the basis of aggregate information and
compensation based on damage schedules? On these issues, we still have
neither answer nor consensus,20 although asbestos and other toxic tort
litigation has already spawned extraordinary procedural innovation,
gation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 505, 510-11 (1988) (defining p-value and explaining confi-
dence intervals).
19. See generally the useful and readable account by Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts
with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing
Scientific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing need to
aid courts in understanding complex scientific evidence).
20. For the classic argument that courts should award collective relief in toxic tort cases,
basing liability findings on statistical proof and awarding scheduled damages, see David Ro-
senberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort
System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 851, 908-24 (1984). But see the strenuous rebuttals in Richard A.
Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation of the ALI Proposal,
10 J.L. & COM. 1, 5-33 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of
Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 475, 479-506 (1984); Peter Huber, Safety and the
Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277,
319-20, 331-35 (1985). See generally George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A
Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461
(1985) (discussing historical development of enterprise liability theory and its judicial accept-
ance in 1960s).
[Vol. 25:819
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elaborate claim resolution mechanisms and other bureaucratic mecha-
nisms to pay claims.21
A. An Evidence Dilemma
Nobody can be confident that we are on the verge of answering these
questions. Courts continue to entertain toxic tort suits, and the causation
issue has an evidential dimension that cannot be avoided. Unfortunately
evidence law speaks to this issue only vaguely and not very usefully.
It is well known that standard doctrine often condemns statistical
proof, either for demonstrable misuse or more generally in "blue bus"
cases because such evidence is considered inferior to particularized proof
and likely to mislead.22 On the other hand, statistical proof is admitted
in discrimination and paternity suits and recognized as the basis of foren-
sic testimony in criminal cases.2 3 Such proof has been admitted in collec-
tive toxic tort suits like In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation,24
and courts seem ready to admit it in individual toxic tort suits. However,
it is at least open to doubt in both settings that evidence of this sort can
carry the day without individualized proof of causation.25
Evidence law also has something to say on the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony. Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 set up open-tex-
tured standards that say essentially that experts can testify if qualified, if
21. See Samuel Issacharoff, Administering Damage Awards in Mass-Tort Litigation, 10
REv. LITIG. 463, 470-87 (1991); Jack Ratliff, Special Master's Report, in Cimino v. Raymark
Industries, Inc., 10 REv. LrrIG. 521, 528-35 (1991); Symposium, Claims Resolution Facilities
and the Mass Settlement of Mass Torts, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 1, 1
(Frances E. McGovern ed.; collecting articles on point).
22. See the notorious case of State v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr.
497 (1968), wherein a prosecutor misused the product rule to try to demonstrate guilt. "Blue
bus" problems arise when a claimant tries to prove, for example, that an instrumentality oper-
ated or produced by the defendant caused the injury because most observed instrumentalities
in the area were operated or produced by the defendant. See Guenther v. Armstrong Rubber
Co., 406 F.2d 1315, 1317-18 (3d Cir. 1969); Smith v. Rapid Transit, 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Mass.
1945).
23. See, eg., Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (statistical evidence made prima
facie case of discrimination in selection of grand juries); Plemel v. Walter, 735 P.2d 1209 (Or.
1987) (paternity index).
24. 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (lengthy examination of epidemiological proof in
approving settlement of class action), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1004 (1988).
25. See generally Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Problems of Proof, Stan-
dards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986) (discussing issues of
statistical proof and causation in toxic tort litigation).
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what they have to say is helpful 2 6 and if they rely on information that
their peers would rely on.27 However, fifteen years after adoption of the
Rules, it remains unclear whether the Rules endorse the old Frye stan-
dard that asks whether the underlying method and theory the expert
used to arrive at a conclusion has attained a level of general acceptance in
the scientific community; or whether the Rules abandon Frye in favor of
a stricter, particularized assessment of expert testimony, or loosen Frye
and therefore pave the way for such evidence and other proof that seems
promising although not yet generally accepted.28 One scholar has argued
that the helpfulness criterion of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires
courts to pass on the soundness of underlying theories, while the reason-
able reliance criterion of Federal Rule of Evidence 703 applies to the data
that informs expert opinion,29 although this analysis leaves it unclear
whether courts are to determine whether the method or theory is sound
and, if so, by what criterion.
In this climate of uncertainty, courts conflict on fundamental points,
like whether epidemiological evidence is critical in proving toxicity;
30
26. FED. R. EVID. 702 (witness qualified as expert may testify as to "scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge [if it] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue").
27. FED. R. EvID. 703 (experts may base opinions on facts or data reasonably relied on by
other experts in same field). Experts may also rely on first hand perceptions or may draw upon
facts or information admitted at the hearing in which they are testifying. GLEN WEIS-
SENBERGER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMEN-
TARY AND AUTHORITY § 703.1, at 303 (1987).
28. The Frye standard came from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
For an argument that Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705 abandon any form of categorical
standard in favor of individualized assessments of expert testimony, see Margaret A. Berger,
United States v. Scoli: The Common-Law Approach to an Expert's Opinion About a Witness's
Credibility Still Does Not Work, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 559, 565-69, 588-89 (1989). But in 1991
the Fifth Circuit held, in an en banc decision, that scientific testimony on the issue of toxic
causation must satisfy the Frye standard and that a court may properly reject testimony that it
believes other experts in the field would not find convincing. See Christophersen v. Allied-
Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1113-15 (5th Cir. 1991) (incorporating Frye standard in FED. R.
EVID. 703 and approving award of summary judgment for defendant in case alleging that toxic
fumes caused cancer, in part because plaintiff's physician relied on facts and data that were
critically inaccurate and incomplete, as measured by what other experts would rely on; per
curium opinion with 13 participating judges; Judge Clark concurring in result, relying on FED.
R. EVID. 403; four others join in separate dissenting opinions by Judges Reavely and King).
For a modem attempt to modify the Frye standard by looking at reliability, "fit" and risk of
prejudice or confusion, see United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 1985).
29. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Struc-
ture of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 13-19 (1988).
30. Compare In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1250 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (relying heavily on epidemiological evidence, rejecting animal models, criticizing claim-
ants for failing to offer proof by examining physicians), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988) with Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535-36
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whether the opinion of a treating physician on toxicity should suffice to
prove causation where the physician is not an expert in toxicology and
the diagnosis is highly controversial;3" whether experts testifying on the
basis of experimental data may depart from conclusions reached by those
who originally gathered the data;32 whether bioassays or animal studies
can support an inference of cause;33 and whether courts should require
epidemiological evidence to attain the levels of statistical significance and
confidence intervals that scientists would require.3"
B. How Can We Solve These Problems?
Almost certainly, some problems can be resolved through common
law evolution or reform of the Rules. A pending reform proposal would
address the matter of a standard for scientific evidence, and the apparent
intent is to adopt a modified Frye standard in which scientific evidence
would need "significant support and acceptance within the scientific
community."35 Surely this reform is a step forward in at least addressing
a basic question, and the strength in the proposal is that it would require
some external validation before scientific evidence would be admissible.
(D.C. Cir.) (causation need not be proved by epidemiological or animal studies; tissue samples,
standard tests and testimony by examining physician suffice), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062
(1984).
31. See In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1247 (criticizing claimants for failing to offer
proof by examining physicians).
32. Compare Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (ex-
perts should not use epidemiological data to reach conclusions that differ from those reached
by people who gathered data), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989) and Lynch v. Merrell-Na-
tional Lab., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (denying use of expert testimony regarding birth
defects caused by Bendectin "in the absence of any confirmatory epidemiological data") with
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990) (approving meta-
analysis that uses data gathered in several studies to reach conclusions that differ from those
reached in original studies).
33. See In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1234, 1238 (rejecting animal models).
34. Compare Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, modified, 884
F.2d 166 (5th Cir.) (statistical proof may be admitted even if it does not satisfy usual standard
of significance, but it may not suffice to carry day), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1511 (1990) with In
re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990) (questioning whether usual .05
levil of significance should be required before statistical evidence may be admitted), cert. de-
nied, 11i S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
35. Pending changes to Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 can be read as setting a test
or standard. As revised, Rule 702 would add a requirement that "information" provided by
expert testimony be "reasonably reliable" and would modify the helpfulness criterion by re-
quiring that such information "substantially assist" the fact finder. The accompanying Advi-
sory Committee's note provides that the committee does not intend to "return" to the Frye
standard, but that a court should "reject testimony that is based upon premises lacking any
significant support and acceptance within the scientific community or that otherwise would be
only marginally helpful." Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 157 (1991).
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Arguably the proposal miscasts the balance (it would be better to put
directly to courts the question of scientific validity, to be decided like
other issues on the basis of testimony), but requiring external validation
is realistic in recognizing that judges are not scientists and not well situ-
ated to make independent scientific judgments.36
But no general standard or test can show courts how to resolve cau-
sation issues at the frontiers of understanding, and the cases show courts
are struggling even to find an approach. Courts need help that evidence
law cannot provide. Proposals for science courts have gotten nowhere,
perhaps because they require legislation that Congress is not prepared to
enact, perhaps because it is understood that science alone cannot answer
questions with legal and political dimensions.3 7 Intermediate proposals
for mechanisms to bring science into the courtroom, such as science advi-
sory panels and education for judges, merit serious consideration despite
the problems to be expected in merging such mechanisms into an adver-
sary system.38 Also needed is some insight on the underlying logic of
scientific standards of statistical proof.39
If scientists require high significance levels and narrow confidence
intervals (high confidence) as a margin of safety because they doubt their
capacity to anticipate and control variables, perhaps the scientific and
legal standard should be the same-the practice of scientists is a good
guide to the reliability of statistical data. To the extent scientists observe
strict standards because they have time to refine approaches or pursue
other avenues of approach, and need not resolve some particular question
in order to move forward, perhaps courts are justified in making do with
less.
It has been argued that if a physician would prescribe treatment in
the belief that he knows the cause of an ailment, a court should treat the
physician's opinion as good enough to prove cause.40 Yet doctors treat
36. See, eg., Richard 0. Lempert, Social Science in Court: On "Eyewitness Experts" and
Other Issues, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 175 (1986) (if psychologists do not agree on value
of their insights, "how can a psychologically naive judge, whose primary task is to resolve the
case in front of him, be expected to value it properly?").
37. See, eg., Sheldon R. Trubatch, Informed Judicial Decisionmaking: A Suggestion for a
Judicial Office for Understanding Science and Technology, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 255
(1985).
38. See Brennan, supra note 19, at 10.
39. See David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 13, 20-23; Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort
Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713, 749-67 (1982); Richard W. Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1737, 1821-26 (1985).
40. See Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of
Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521, 529 (1986) (investigative scientists are likely "to suspend
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suspected cancers and other ailments without understanding clinical
cause, and even the certainty of one physician with one patient seems
inadequate as a basis to impose thousandfold liability for a thousand
claimants if toxicological evidence of other sorts cannot be had. The
quest to adapt scientific methods and standards to toxic tort litigation is
still in an embryonic stage. Few mass toxic tort cases have been actually
tried on any issue, and most lead to settlements, perhaps because the
parties themselves fear that trials and evidence rules cannot be depended
upon to achieve good results. But evidence issues will not likely be
avoided forever, and courts need technical help that neither experience
nor refinement of doctrine can provide.
III. CHILD ABUSE PROSECUTIONS
The issues in child abuse prosecutions are hard for obvious reasons:
the charged misconduct is repellent and tragic; the cost of a mistaken
verdict seems high; the cases pit child against parent or guardian and
parents or guardians against each other; there are few witnesses with
firsthand knowledge; and there are few disinterested witnesses.
A. Hearsay
The hearsay challenge comes from the fact that remote statements
by the child often say what happened and who did it and seem probative
on central points. Remote statements may be critical if the child is too
young to testify, is traumatized by the courtroom setting or the accused,
and where clinical evidence is inconclusive or other evidence is lacking.
Also remote statements vary widely, sometimes coming shortly after the
event when the child speaks to family members, social service people,
friends, police or doctors and sometimes coming much later during inter-
views with professional psychologists, where a picture of abuse emerges
only slowly. Remote statements may also be hard to appraise because
the alleged abuse is the focal point of a dispute between adults generating
pressures on the child, or because the suspect is a parent and a crucial
figure in the child's life.
B. Expert Testimony
The challenge of expert testimony comes from its use to present ac-
counts of "Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome" (patterns of behavior in vic-
tims), which can then be compared with the behavior of a particular
judgment" while awaiting further proof in cases where doctor or lawyer "does not have the
luxury of postponing decision").
April 1992]
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child in trying to decide whether abuse occurred and whether the child
should be believed." Courts differ in receptivity to such evidence,
although much is admitted. Here are the points of greatest ongoing diffi-
culty: Do lay fact finders need expert assistance in understanding the
phenomenon of child abuse in order to make the necessary appraisals of
behavior and credibility? Should experts be allowed not only to provide
"framework" evidence but also make the invited comparison by testify-
ing, on the basis of their knowledge or observation of the child, that
abuse occurred (or did not) or the child is truthful (or not)? Oversimpli-
fying, the prevailing answer to the first question is yes (expert "frame-
work" testimony is needed and often admitted), and the prevailing
answer to the second is no (commonly experts cannot testify that abuse
occurred or a child is telling the truth).
C. Can Evidence Law Solve These Problems?
Modem courts have made a start. They often admit remote state-
ments by children under exceptions for excited utterances and statements
to physicians,42 and under catchall or rifle-shot child abuse exceptions
turning on circumstantial trustworthiness.43 And courts look to an array
of factors that bear on reliability, including age-appropriate language,
display of knowledge not likely to exist unless abuse occurred, apparent
spontaneity, repetition, absence of leading questions, corroborating phys-
41. See David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles, and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach
to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L.
REv. 19, 41-42 (1987); David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Com-
plainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological
Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1986); Robert P. Mosteller, Legal Doctrines
Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning Social Framework Evidence, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 85, 112-20. See generally Laurens Walker & John
Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877
(1988) (examining use of social science research data to prove contested facts in judicial pro-
ceeding); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science
in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987) (application of social science research to sexual abuse cases
does not concern legislative or adjudicative fact but creates "framework" to determine facts).
42. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 946-47, 949 (4th Cir. 1988) (child's statements to
psychologist within exceptions for excited utterance and statements to physicians); United
States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 438-39 (8th Cir. 1985) (child's statements to treating physi-
cian properly admitted under exception for statements to physicians); Haggins v. Warden, 715
F.2d 1050, 1057-58 (6th Cir. 1983) (statements by four-year-old victim to police properly ad-
mitted as excited utterance), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984).
43. United States v. St. John, 851 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (8th Cir. 1988) (statements by ten-
year-old boy to clinical psychologist); United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1444-45 (8th
Cir. 1986) (statements by five-year-old girl to foster mother and social worker).
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ical evidence, the presence or absence of wider disputes among caretakers
and closeness in time to the event.'
Remote statements remain problematic, however, and cases relying
on factors like excitement and concern over treatment do not inspire con-
fidence. The courts' modern confrontation jurisprudence, while cau-
tiously flexible in allowing alternatives to live courtroom testimony by
children, has not extended to the catchall exceptions the categorical en-
dorsement that traditional exceptions enjoy, and requires instead a case
by case scrutiny for trustworthiness, with no credit for independent cor-
roboration.45 Presumably the same scrutiny is required of rifle-shot child
abuse exceptions that follow catchall exceptions in referring directly to
"trustworthiness" or "reliability" as the principal criteria.
Do experience and common law evolution promise growing wisdom
in this area? Such faith underlies many codified categorical exceptions
that largely embody common law tradition, and reliance on judges seems
essential. And in this setting the faith seems justified-judicial experi-
ence should increase understanding, and the instinct of trial judges over-
seen by deferential reviewing courts deserves respect. There is little
reason to suppose the expertise of psychologists or therapists can help
much. In toxic tort cases, proportional or classwide relief "based on the
numbers" is at least plausible. However, the question in prosecutions for
child abuse is inescapably singular, so what may be true in the run of
cases cannot decide a particular case, and there is no reason to suppose
experts can better assess the credibility of particular children than lay
fact finders.
44. See Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3150 (1990) (listing spontaneity, repetition,
mental state of declarant, use of terminology unexpected for child of similar age, lack of mo-
tive to fabricate).
45. Compare Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3166-67 (1990) (on specific finding of
trauma, court properly allowed child to testify from another room, viewed from video monitor
in court) with Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3149 -50 (constitutional error to admit child's incriminating
statement under catchall exception, which is not "firmly rooted" for purposes of Confrontation
Clause; in assessing reliability, court cannot consider corroborating evidence). In 1992, how-
ever, the Supreme Court upheld the use against an accused of five statements by a child
describing an instance of abuse and identifying the defendant as the abuser. The decision, at a
minimum, stands for the proposition that statements satisfying the exceptions for excited utter-
ances and for statements made in the course of receiving medical treatment may be admitted
without showing that the speaker is unavailable. The decision may even stand for the broader
proposition that unavailability is never required by the Constitution unless, perhaps, it is re-
quired by the hearsay doctrine. See White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992) (statements by
four-year-old girl to babysitter, mother and police investigator admissible as excited utter-
ances; statements to nurse and treating physician admissible under medical treatment excep-
tion; defendant was outsider to household and child named him in all but statement to nurse,
which didn't mention name; all five statements described abuse).
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The judicial unease visible in the cases is understandable because the
problem is truly difficult. While the accumulation of outcomes in paral-
lel cases can tell much about the soundness of substantive doctrine, ongo-
ing experience may be less revealing of the wisdom of admitting or
excluding hearsay. Lacking knowledge whether a particular case or run
of cases correctly found the facts, courts would be right to wonder
whether a particular ruling admitting or excluding remote statements by
children represents wisdom, and whether, if one case weighs in on a par-
ticular kind of hearsay, the resultant line of authority is sound.
On the wisdom of expert "framework" testimony, evidence law
needs further help from social science. One supposition underlying such
testimony is that lay fact finders know little about child abuse and do not
understand child victims, but little is actually known about the level of
general public understanding. An important premise underlying such
testimony is that experts not only understand the behavior of child vic-
tims of abuse but can distinguish between the behavior of such victims
and the behavior of children troubled for other reasons, which is less
than certain. 4 6 Another is that fact finders can take a short lesson on the
subject, thereby developing insights that help them evaluate the evidence,
while remaining responsible and independent in performing these tasks.
But we have little information that lay fact finders can grow and perform
in this way.47
Absent empirical data on public understanding and the capacity of
fact finders to grow in understanding while retaining their independence,
the course charted by modem courts seems appropriately cautious.
Probably typical fact finders do know and understand the phenomenon of
child abuse in somewhat the same way they understand drug trafficking
and murder (where experts do testify on the jargon of drug traffickers
and organizational patterns of drug traders, which is similar to frame-
work evidence), but it is likely they have little feel for reactions and be-
havior of child victims after the fact, and evidence on this point should
help understanding. In shrinking from expert psychological testimony
46. Compare John E. B. Meyers et al., Expert Testimony in Child SexualAbuse Litigation,
68 NEB. L. Rv. 1, 52-62, 77 (1989) (experts can often determine "with reasonable clinical
certainty" whether abuse has occurred) with Josephine Bulkley, Legal Proceedings, Reforms,
and Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 153, 179 (1988) (no
reliable test or method to determine abuse).
47. At least one California decision insists that proponents of framework evidence in child
abuse cases explain the risk of misunderstanding that framework would correct and give a
cautionary instruction to the jury that it remains the judge of the issues. See People v. Leon,
263 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1989), reh'g denied and order depublished, No. S012979, 1990 Cal. LEXIS
158, at *1 (Jan. 18, 1990).
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that a particular child was abused or should be believed in what he says,
courts also seem wise in concluding that expertise on the general subject
does not qualify even professional observers to tell lay fact finders whom
to believe or what inferences to draw from the evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts need help that neither evidence doctrine nor experience is
likely to provide in the area of toxic tort litigation. Absent some resolu-
tion of structural, substantive and procedural issues that relieves courts
of the responsibility to resolve toxic causation problems, courts need
more science and a better understanding of the relationship of legal and
scientific standards.
In child abuse prosecutions, science is less likely to have solutions
because the issues are inescapably singular and less accessible to statisti-
cal resolution. Hearsay issues are being addressed in the manner typical
of common law evolution, and there is reason for some optimism that
courts can resolve them. Social framework evidence describing Abused
Child Syndrome may be of some use, but it too can do little to resolve
particular controversies. In sum, we badly need meta-evidence in toxic
tort cases, in the form of help from outside the legal profession. In child
abuse prosecutions we need it less. There, outside help is useful, but only
in limited ways, and progress is more likely to come from experience and
doctrinal evolution.
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